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study of chemical thermodynamics, develops the general physical principles of the same science, notably in their bearing upon chemistry, and finally, in its consideration of false equilibria and of explosions, enters into the detailed application of the foregoing theoretical parts. The work is predominantly mathematical, but for its subject is simple and not wanting in æsthetic qualities, to which the outward labors of the publishers have added a welcome and agreeable typographical emphasis. Duhem's treatise aims at marshaling in compact and systematic form all the main results of mathematical physical chemistry, which hitherto have largely lain scattered and isolated in scientific reports, and so forms an indispensable work for the scientific library.

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HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE EUROPÉENNE. Par *Alfred Weber*. Sixième édition.

Paris: Fischbacher. 1897. Pages, 500.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Alfred Weber*, Professor in the University of Strassburg. Authorised Translation by Frank Thilly, A. M., Ph. D. From the Fifth French Edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1896. Pages, 630.

LEIBNIZENS STREIT GEGEN LOCKE IN ANSEHUNG DER ANGEBORENEN IDEEN. Von Frank Thilly. Heidelberg: Universitäts-Buchdruckerei von J. Hörning. 1891.

France is not as rich in histories of philosophy as Germany, and it is remarkable that the author of this most scholarly and comprehensive work on the History of Philosophy is an Alsatian who had the advantage of passing through French as well as German universities, and has combined in a happy alliance the advantages of both.

Alfred Weber is a descendant of one of the old Alsatian families which were mentioned centuries ago in the chronicles of the free city of Strassburg. He was Professor at the University of Strassburg while Alsace was still in the possession of France. When the Germans seized the country he remained in his position and is at present still there as head of the Philosophical Department.

During his younger years, Weber was powerfully attracted by the religious philosophy of Schelling who was one of the apostles of a monistic conception of the world on the basis of natural science,—not in a narrow sense of the so-called physical sciences which would exclude a due consideration of the more significant branches of anthropology and psychology, but in the broadest sense of the word nature. Weber was also influenced by Hegel, but he never allowed himself to become a blind follower of the philosophy of the Absolute. After a study of Schopenhauer's works, Weber wrote a little pamphlet in which he embodies his criticism of the great pessimist by emphasising that the will to live with the growth of civilisation changes into a will to realise the good. Schopenhauer has utterly neglected in his system of thought this will to realise the good, and yet how much more power-

ful does the latter grow in the course of evolution than the former, for we even find people who do not believe in an immortality of the soul, willingly sacrificing their lives for the sake of their ideals.

In accordance with this latest development of Weber's views, the Alsatian philosopher views religion as a will to realise eternal life. He finds at the very beginning of the religious evolution of mankind that the religious sentiment originates on account of death. Man witnesses the death of his dear ones, and he comprehends that death is the common fate of all, including himself. Religion is the natural reaction which the thought of death produces in man, and this is and remains its characteristic feature from the beginning to the present day. It shows itself in the superstitions of the savage as well as in the confessions of faith of all the various religions that now prevail upon earth. Everywhere the immortality idea is uppermost, and without it there would be no religion.

These two pamphlets on the will to realise the good, and on religion as the will to realise eternal life, are written in German, the mother-tongue of the Alsatians, while all the other books of Professor Weber are composed in French, the language of his early education. In spite of the small size of his German pamphlets, they embody the most salient and important thoughts that characterise Professor Weber's philosophy.

As to Professor Weber's History of European Philosophy, we can only recommend it to the student of philosophy, in justification of which we simply point to the fact that it has reached its sixth edition. The book has been well received in Germany as well as in France, and we dare say it is one of the standard books which in many respects compares favorably with Erdmann and Ueberweg, and I would not hesitate to give it preference over more modern German works in the same field. The book is not overloaded with professorial paraphernalia; *non olet cattedram*. The absence of footnotes and other learned apparatus so conspicuous in German works will be a pleasant feature to many readers. References to the sources are not omitted, but they are reduced to the utmost, and partly woven into the text, which renders the book a remarkable combination of French elegance and German thoroughness. The style is limpid and presents scarcely any difficulties even to foreigners who possess only the ordinary reading knowledge of French. The résumés of the various philosophical systems are complete and yet brief. Nothing of importance is omitted, and nothing is treated at undue length. Modern philosophy and also its development on American soil is not included in the scheme of this book. Darwin and the contemporaneous monism, together with the French positivism and the German neo-criticism are only briefly mentioned; and in the conclusion of his work Weber merely suggests his views of the great agreements that obtain among all philosophies. They consist in the recognition of reason, the postulation of an essential unity of all things, the observation of the universality of struggle, of effort, of will, and of conscience, the affirmation of the moral ideal which is the ultimate aim of the creative efforts and the cosmic becoming. Thus,

nature is development, the infinite perfectibility of which forms at the same time its impulsive force and its highest goal.

The print of the book is clear and pleasant, and it is a pity that after the fashion of European books it contains no index, which will be missed, especially by American readers.

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Professor Weber's *History of Philosophy* has been translated into English by Frank Thilly, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri, because the latter deems it "the most serviceable manual thus far published." He sums up his view of the work as follows: "It begins as simply as the history of philosophy "itself, and gradually introduces the reader to the complex problems of modern "thought, to which it devotes more than one-half of its entire space. The portions "dealing with Kant and his successors are particularly admirable. The clear and "comprehensive exposition of the Hegelian philosophy will greatly assist the stu- "dent in his endeavors to understand that much abused system. And the modern "theory of evolution, which has revolutionised the thought of our century, and "which is barely mentioned by Falckenberg and Windelband, surely deserves the "attention and criticism it here receives."

Professor Thilly's translation is in every respect admirable. It is not slavishly literal, but it shows an independent mind which considers the needs of the reader and adds several helps which greatly increase the value of the book. The translation is made from the fifth edition, but since Professor Weber has communicated to the translator the changes and additions he intended to make, it is as good as if it had been made from the sixth edition, which has in the meantime appeared. We have not been able to discover a difference of any importance. Professor Thilly has added brief references, especially to American and English publications, which are not mentioned in the original, and has also added an exhaustive index of eighteen pages, which, at least in the opinion of Americans, is indispensable to any work of over six hundred pages, and especially to a book that is used both as a textbook and for reference. It seems that any one who would desire to use the original could do it better by first referring to Professor Thilly's translation. There can be no question about that, that as a text-book for philosophical students in English and American universities Weber's book in Professor Thilly's translation is highly recommendable.

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The translator of Weber's *Histoire de la philosophie* took his doctor's degree several years ago at Heidelberg on the ground of a very creditable dissertation treating in a purely historical manner the controversy of Leibnitz *contra* Locke concerning innate ideas. It is one of the most important phases of a struggle that is still to be fought out in philosophy. There is on the one side rationalism, represented by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, and on the other side empiricism, represented by Bacon, Locke, and Hume. The question is, Are there innate ideas

or not? Descartes says, There are; and Locke denies the existence of innate ideas; while Leibnitz in criticising Locke's position accepts but modifies the doctrine of innate ideas. Locke considers mind in its original state as a *tabula rasa*, and declares: *nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu*; and "being in the intellect" is, in Locke's opinion, being conscious of an idea. Leibnitz concedes that conscious ideas are not innate. Yet if all knowledge rises from the senses, how can we have any conception of necessity. Necessity is to Leibnitz the test of innate ideas, and innate ideas are no longer to him conscious thoughts but dispositions of the mind, *Anlagen*; he accepts Locke's position: "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu*," but he adds, "*nisi ipse intellectus*."

Thilly discusses first the relation of Locke to Bacon, then that of Locke to Descartes, and finally Leibnitz's case against Locke. Here he leaves the question without adding any opinion of his own, showing throughout the fairness and impartial exactness that should always distinguish the historian.

The subject being of extraordinary interest we feel tempted to add a few remarks. We should say that Locke's criticism of Descartes was in one main point just: Locke was right in denying the existence of innate ideas. Yet Locke misunderstood Descartes's position. Descartes contrasts sense-perception and thoughts or ideas—a distinction which was never made by Locke. Sensations are impressions; they are not yet knowledge; they are different from ideas or pure thoughts (*noumena*), and cognition is possible only through thinking; and as Descartes sees no possibility for certain ideas to originate from sense-experience alone, he assumes that some ideas are innate. Locke makes no distinction between sense-impressions and thoughts. He calls both "ideas." Thus it was natural that in spite of the justice of his criticism, he did not succeed in overcoming Descartes's proposition. If the mind was a *tabula rasa*, then there was after all something innate; there was nothing written on the primitive mind, but something can be written on it. This would have been the consistent conclusion, and this was indeed in the main Leibnitz's position.

Have later philosophers left the question in this dilemma? It almost appears so, for in spite of Kant, both schools are still represented to-day. The innate ideas of Leibnitz and the *tabula rasa* of Locke are now called the ego, the monon, the self, the soul, and other mystical names.

In our opinion, there is no such a thing as a mind that is a *tabula rasa*. The problem is not, How come ideas into the mind? but, How does mind originate? Mind and ideas are not two things; they are inseparable. No mind without ideas, no ideas without a mind. In other words, mind is a systematised union of ideas; mind is a commonwealth of thoughts; and among the ideas that people our mind, there are some which do not rise from sense-impressions; these are the conceptions of the formal sciences. The question therefore is, How do the ideas of formal thought originate? An answer to this question shows that the commonwealth of ideas—the mind—possesses some constitutional forms through which sense-impressions are worked out into cognition. These forms originate from and grow with

experience. They are an expression of the same forms that condition the order of the objective universe. The presence of these forms changes sensations into ideas or thoughts, and thus makes of a sentient being a thinking mind. Sensations are presentative feelings; ideas are representative. Alone through these forms, which are formulated in mathematics, logic, etc., a mind conceives the idea of necessity which cannot be deduced out of the mere data of sense-experience. Cognition is possible only through a constant reference to these forms and formal systems. Leibnitz is therefore right that there is in every mind not only that which came into it through the senses but also the mind itself, viz., that something which represents the relations among the sense-impressions; there are the categories in which they are arranged and also the systems of pure forms which are abstracted from such arrangements. Yet the fact that these mental forms are constitutional does not render them innate or mystical. That element of experience which produces them is a universal feature of reality; it is form. The idea of necessity is nothing but the universality of the law of sameness that has become conscious.

P. C.

NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. By *Wilhelm Gottfried Leibnitz*. Together with an Appendix. Translated by Alfred Gideon Langley. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. Pp. 861. Price, \$3.25.

The students of philosophy who go to the sources for their knowledge and are not content to rely wholly upon historical expositions, will welcome the present work containing the New Essays of Leibnitz. The translator, Mr. Alfred Gideon Langley, has performed his arduous task carefully, and supplied to the text a vast volume of bibliography and biographical notes, which, with the original matter itself, have swelled the book to 861 octavo pages. In the face of this fact it is well that the translator did not incorporate his intended "Introduction on the Philosophy of Leibnitz" in the work. The book is a translation of the entire fifth volume of Gerhardt's edition of the philosophical works of Leibnitz, including Gerhardt's brief introductory remarks of nine pages—matter which, being partly Latin, partly French, and partly German, has never before in its entirety been translated into English. The contents of the volume are too well known to philosophical students to need restatement, and we shall only say that the four books of which they consist treat: (1) of innate ideas; (2) of ideas; (3) of words; (4) of knowledge. The appendix, besides notes and introductions, contains the letter of Leibnitz to Jacob Thomasius on the history of philosophy, one or two fragments, an essay on atoms and on the origin of things, and most important of all the essays on dynamics which constitute the body of Leibnitz's share in the great controversy of the eighteenth century on the measure of force. It is important to know that these essays are contained in this volume. The indexes are unusually full and complete, and great care seems to have been exercised in all points of textual criticism. Upon the whole, we have a useful work, rendering a distinct service to the literature of philosophy.

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